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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICARE AFTER THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT
SENATOR DAVID DURENBERGER*
By adapting the payment structure of America’s private health insurance,
Medicare, from its inception, has provided access to a unique healthcare
system for elderly and disabled Americans. For several decades, Congress
has also used Medicare as a policy tool to contain rising healthcare costs.1
The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA)2 is the latest and, perhaps, the
most significant of these cost-containment efforts.
In order to understand the role Medicare will play in containing future
healthcare costs, it helps to understand how difficult it is to influence
behavior in the delivery system. The United States has always enjoyed a
healthcare system different from those of all other countries. Therefore, we
cannot simply adapt another country’s older, tried-and-true model for our
own cost-containment policy.
Most Americans choose a job, a health insurance plan, and a doctor;
and the insurance and doctor make the rest of the decisions. Accordingly,
the doctor-patient relationship is dominated by the physician’s autonomy
and is reinforced by the influence physician professional societies have on
economics, clinical improvement, and public finance policy.3
For many years, most insurance plans have simply paid for service
volume, rather than value, and most physicians have liked it that way.4
Medicare was no different. Even more problematic is the fact that Medicare
(with one brief exception in the short-lived Medicare Catastrophic Act of
* Chair of the National Institute of Health Policy; former U.S. senior senator from Minnesota.
1. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 517, 744
5th ed. 2004) (discussing how public-health program cost-control efforts have focused on
limiting prices paid for services or the use of managed care and that, in response to
increasing costs, the ongoing Medicare-reform debate focuses on how the program should
pay for healthcare services).
2. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
3. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 217 (1982).
4. See Id. at 325-26 (comparing direct-service plans (volume) with service-benefits plans
(value), commenting on a service-benefit plan that “plunged into crisis” when it attempted to
review physicians’ decisions about hospitalization, and asserting that direct-service plans
create an inherent “environment of constraints, such as a fixed supply of hospital beds,” which
physicians can take for granted in “day-to-day medical decision making”).
221

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

222

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 1:221

1988) 5 has never protected beneficiaries from financial catastrophe. What
results is a market dysfunction that is not present in any other part of the
U.S. economy. (Education is the only sector that comes close).
The standard of quality in healthcare is “the doctors know best.” Third
party employers and insurers indemnify the costs of healthcare.
Accountability is based on what the doctors do, not on how well they
perform. More is always better; the higher the price, the greater the
presumed value; and brand name medicine is the vogue.
While this insurance policy has given us access to an explosion of
medical technology, our population’s health status has generally declined
and the incidence of chronic illness has rapidly risen.6 Medicare and other
public funding sources invest billions of dollars per year in new discoveries
(plus a few million in evaluating them) and ensuring older Americans have
the ability to make informed decisions as they enter lives of increased
dysfunction. Yet, the average life expectancy in the United States is no
better than the average life expectancy of a developed nation; and the
healthy life expectancy (age sixty-seven for males and age seventy-one for
females) is among the lowest.7
Medical care prices reflect production costs, as well as inefficiencies, the
cost of treating the uninsured and underinsured, geographic location,
medical education, and clinical research.8 We, as consumers of this care,
are only responsible for choosing the doctor, not the care, because the
information needed to make decisions about medical care is exclusively in
the doctors’ hands. As a result, we are unhealthy people with very
unhealthy expectations, and none of us are held appropriately accountable
or individually responsible.
Healthcare costs per capita in the United States are twice what they are
in any other country9 and are crowding out spending on every other
5. See Thomas Rice et al., The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act: A Post-Mortem, 9
HEALTH AFF. 75, 76-78 (1990) (noting that less than two years after enacting the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act, Congress retracted it because of “negative public reaction”).
6. See Gary Rotstein, Boomer Health Decline Reported: Are They Less Well than Earlier
Group? Or is it Imagined?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 2007, at A1, at www.postgazette.com/pg/07077/770461-114.stm# (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
7. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH STATUS: MORTALITY 28 (2006), available at
www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006_mortality.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
8. See Health Care and the Budget–Issues and Challenges for Reform, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 4-9 (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag,
Director, Congressional Budget Office) (outlining several factors contributing to medical costs,
including new medical therapies and technology, geography, insurance factors, and quantity
of healthcare services).
9. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SNAPSHOT: HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN THE
UNITED STATES AND OECD COUNTRIES (Jan. 2007), at http://kff.org/insurance/snapshot/
chcm010307oth.cfm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007) (noting that U.S. healthcare spending per
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common good, except homeland security and international wars. How have
we managed to do this to ourselves? Sociologist Paul Starr answers this
question in his books The Social Transformation of American Medicine and
The Logic of Health Reform, concluding that “the American health care
system has developed under the shaping influence of incentives for private
decision makers to expand and intensify medical services.”10
What will we get for the $2.3 trillion spent on healthcare11 in the United
States this year? We will get more, and presumably better, drugs, devices,
diagnostics, and specialty facilities. Patient safety, however, is unlikely to
improve. The patient safety record in the United States has not changed
much since the IOM reported 98,000 patients needlessly die each year in
America’s hospitals.12 The employee safety record is just as shameful. Dr.
Jack Wennberg and his Dartmouth colleagues have made us aware of the
clinical outcome disparities in medical practice across the country.13 They
argue that if Medicare paid all hospitals and doctors what it pays providers
in the lowest-cost regions of the country, Medicare could save almost 30%
of what it spends in one year on health benefits under the traditional
program.14 (Total Medicare spending was projected to reach $429.7 billion
in 2007.)15
In my community, at last count, there were over 400 allied or ancillary
health professional guilds operating in much the same way and to the same
end as guilds were in Adam Smith’s day. Yet, both private plans and public
programs continue to reward those who refuse to improve healthcare at the
financial expense of practitioners and communities that continually seek to
improve what they do and how they do it. Efficiency, effectiveness,
productivity, and perfection are words commonly used when discussing
healthcare but rarely put into practice. Health professionals make little use
capita is “at least 24% higher than the next highest spending countries, and over 90% higher
than . . . global competitors”).
10. PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHY AND HOW THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN
WILL WORK 23 (Penguin Books 1994) (1992).
11. John A. Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes
Obscure Part D’s Impact, 2007 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w242, w243.
12. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 1999) (using data from a study conducted in New York).
13. See generally John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate over Medicare
Reform, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W96, W96 (discussing how Medicare spending across
the nation varies with no obvious pattern).
14. See id. at W104 (using 1996 numbers to project that $40 billion would have been
saved if “spending levels in the lowest [spending region] were realized in all higher [spending]
regions”).
15. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PROGRAMS AND CMS FINANCIAL DATA:
2007 WALLET CARD, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/CapMarketUpdates/Downloads/2007
WalletCard.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
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of technology to gather and translate information and then apply what we
already know, or should know, to what we need to know right now.
Is it now clear why it is hard to “modernize” Medicare as President Bush
and the Republicans in Congress claimed to do by passing the MMA in
2003? The United States faces a leadership problem, not a legislative
problem. The issue is not with cost-containment; we need to change the
economics of a dysfunctional system that rewards medical professionals in
positions of leadership for playing the “competition” game by rules they may
dislike, but have adapted to, rather than for providing leadership to change
the system. The failure to reward leaders of reform probably stems from the
fact that costs to healthcare consumers are income to healthcare
professionals.
I once heard someone say that human nature inclines us to accept for
our own reality influences on our future that are beyond our control.
Accepting such influences as reality is exactly what every hospital and many
clinical organizations are doing.
How long will the MMA last? The politics of health policy reform help
answer that question. Republicans and Democrats have long held different
ideological views on national health policy.
Democrats have been
egalitarian: if it is good for some, then it is good for everyone. They have
brought Americans the wonders of medical innovation and its
accompanying doctors and hospitals. As champions of universal access
and coverage through public and private insurance, Democrats created
numerous public programs under the Social Security Act to help those
disadvantaged by age, sex, geography, economic condition, and health
condition.
Republicans, traditionally a congressional minority, teamed with more
conservative Democrats from the South, whose long service once made
them important committee chairs, to slow down the liberal tendencies of
northern Democrats. By the early 1970s, the steam of the universal
coverage movement was slowly dissipating. The sand in the gears was the
program costs.16 Dealing with rapidly increasing costs became everyone’s
responsibility. (Costs increased from $75 billion in 1970 to $190 billion in
1978,17 the year I was elected to the Senate.) Therefore, Democrats and
Republicans, from both the North and South, found it necessary to reach a
consensus in committees such as Senate Finance, House Ways and Means,
and House Energy and Commerce.

16. See STARR, supra note 3, at 380 (noting that, beginning in 1975, aspirations such as
national health insurance were thrown aside in the midst of inflation and doubts about
medical care).
17. Stephen H. Lone & W. Pete Welch, Are We Containing Costs or Pushing on a
Balloon?, 7 HEALTH AFF. 113, 114 (1988).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

MEDICARE AFTER THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT

225

From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, partisanship was minimal
in Congress’s enactment of some radical healthcare cost-containment
strategies.18 In the 1970s, Congress’s strategy was supply regulation.19 For
the public sector, Congress chose to use Certificate of Need, Health Systems
Agencies, and Community Health Planning.20 This approach did not work.
The private sector established Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
which were slow getting off the ground because organized medicine
opposed them.21 President Carter proposed putting America’s hospitals on
annual budgets, similar to what is still done in Maryland today.22 Together,
Republicans and Democrats narrowly defeated this proposal and, under
President Reagan, turned to price regulation through prospective pricing
programs like diagnosis related groups for hospitals and resource based
relative value pay with volume performance standards to protect against
excess utilization for doctors.23 Congress began nurturing HMOs with
Medicare risk contracts to provide Medicare-covered services for 95% of the
cost of Medicare fee-for-service.24
By 1990 Americans were consuming $664.5 billion a year in medical
services,25 and HMOs were beginning to merge with each other into larger
and larger national managed care organizations. State Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans began converting from non-profit to for-profit status and
merging with each other into giant plans such as WellPoint and Anthem,
which are now one company.26 National employers especially loved to hire
18. See generally Miriam J. Laugesen & Thomas Rice, Is the Doctor in? The Evolving Role
of Organized Medicine in Health Policy, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 299-301 (2003)
(discussing the internal changes within Congress that transformed payment to the medical
profession).
19. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 518.
20. Id. at 517-18.
21. See id. at 567.
22. See John K. Iglehart, Hospitals, Public Policy, and the Future: An Interview with John
Alexander McMahon, 3 HEALTH AFF. 20, 21, 24-25 (1984) (discussing the American Hospital
Association’s (AHA’s) tolerance of state hospital regulation, such as that enacted in Maryland,
but noting that the AHA’s block against similar national regulation, i.e., “the simplistic kind of
solution offered by President Carter,” was a major achievement).
23. See Laugesen & Rice, supra note 18, at 299-303.
24. Deborah A. Ellwood, Medicare Risk Contracting: Promise and Problems, 5 HEALTH
AFF. 183, 183 (1986).
25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Study – Health Expenditures
(Jan. 29, 1993), at www.hhs.gov/news/press/pre1995pres/930129.txt (last visited Jan. 2,
2008) (citing Health Care Financing Administration’s statistics that health expenditures
increased 11.4% from 1990 to 1991).
26. See Mark A. Hall & Christopher J. Conover, For-Profit Conversion of Blue Cross
Plans: Public Benefit or Public Harm?, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 443, 444 (2006). Blue plans
in fourteen states have converted to for-profit status and most of those plans merged into
WellPoint and Anthem. Id. WellPoint and Anthem merged in 2004. Id.
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these managed care organizations to reduce employee access to
“unneeded” medical services.
In the early 1990s, the conversion to managed care seemed to contain
costs. Annual cost increase, as high as 17% in 1989, fell to zero in 1996.27
However, patients soon joined doctors in objecting to limitations on access
to needed services, and healthcare costs again rose into double digits
annually. By 2000, healthcare spending was approximately $1.3 trillion
and has not changed much since then.28
Although today’s healthcare costs remain consistent with 2000 costs, the
politics and the ideology of prevailing health policy have changed. As
Americans became more centrist in the early part of the 1990s, Republicans
saw a chance to gain majority status in Congress.
“Economically
conservative and socially liberal” Republicans began to win elections. When
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, he vowed to
reform healthcare, bring down its costs, and ensure that every American
could afford health insurance. He gave his wife the task of accomplishing
this reform.29 By bringing together almost every reform idea proposed from
the previous twenty years, Hillary Clinton created the Health Security Act
(HSA).30 Unfortunately, the legislation was so complicated, comprehensive,
and ignorant of political realities that even the group of “mainstream”
Republicans who had been steering much of the bi-partisan Medicare and
Medicaid reform legislation since the early 1980s could not support it.31
More ideologically conservative Republicans saw their chance and
answered Clinton by saying that doing nothing would be better than passing
the HSA.32 But instead of just doing nothing, Republicans recognized the
centrist trend in the country and were able to ride their “Contract with
America,” a contrast to the “socialist medicine” the HSA represented, to a

27. THOMAS A. SCULLY & LAMBERT VAN DER WALDE, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY MARKET UPDATE: MANAGED CARE 2 fig.2 (Nov. 28, 2001), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/CapMarketUpdates/Downloads/hcimu112801.pdf (last visited Jan. 2,
2008).
28. Brian Vastag, IOM Public Health Report Urges Massive Change, 288 JAMA 2807,
2807 (2002).
29. See Julie Rovner, Congress and Health Care Reform 1993-1994, in INTENSIVE CARE:
HOW CONGRESS SHAPES HEALTH POLICY 184-88 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds.,
1995) (discussing the Clinton Plan and Hillary Clinton’s involvement).
30. See id. at 196.
31. See David F. Durenberger & Susan Bartlett Foote, Changing the Way We Think About
Medical Technology Policy, 72 ANNALS THORAC. SURG. 1113, 1113 (2001) (discussing the
Clinton policy’s lack of focus on the public perception of the healthcare problem and the
resulting loss of Republican support).
32. See generally Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan,
14 HEALTH AFF. 66 (1995).
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congressional majority in 1995.33 Republicans continued to reject bipartisan reform efforts because the proposals did not comply with their own
“medical markets” ideology.
When George W. Bush was elected in 2000, he aimed for bi-partisan
domestic policy. Examples of such policies are the No Child Left Behind
Act34 and Immediate Helping Hand, a program to provide low-cost access
to prescription drugs for low-income, medically needy, elderly, and disabled
Americans through federal government support for state Medicaid
programs.35
In a few years, history, not this summary, will tell us exactly how the
President’s Helping Hand program changed health insurance ideology.
There is no doubt, however, that it represents a gigantic change. By a onevote margin secured after three precedent-setting hours of voting in the
House of Representatives, Republicans passed the first partisan change in
Medicare and national health policy in decades, thereby setting an entirely
new course for our health system.36 Spurred on by the rejection of supply
and price regulation as natural cost-containment strategies, Republicans
proposed “consumer-driven healthcare,”37 armed consumers with highdeductible private health insurance plans, and turned them loose on the
healthcare system. They bought Senate votes for their scheme when AARP,
a giant lobbyist for senior-citizen insurance, endorsed Medicare Part D as a
method to create an affordable prescription drug program for every
Medicare beneficiary by using private insurance and pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) pricing and purchasing.38 The apparent success of this
approach was assured when President Bush appointed Dr. Mark McClellan,
formerly of the Food and Drug Administration, to direct MMA
implementation at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
33. Russell L. Riley, Party Government and the Contract with America, 28 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 703, 704 (1995) (discussing the Republicans’ Contract with America, “to which an
overwhelming majority of the party’s congressional candidates publicly pledged allegiance”).
34. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
35. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A RESPONSIBLE
BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S PRIORITIES 113 (2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
usbudget/blueprint/blueprint.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
36. See Ted Barrett, Kennedy Vows Filibuster of Medicare Bill, cnn.com, Nov. 23, 2003,
at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/22/elec04.medicare/ (last visited Jan. 2,
2008).
37. See Ralf Boscheck, Market-Testing Healthcare: Managed Care, Market Evolution and
the Search for Regulatory Principles, 41 INTERECONOMICS 328, 328 (2006) (noting that
President Bush called the transformation of U.S. managed care “consumer-driven healthcare”
in his 2006 State of the Union address).
38. See Jonathan Weisman, Means Test Sought for Medicare Drug Plan, WASH. POST,
Oct. 5, 2007, at A1 (noting that AARP’s endorsement of Part D was “particularly pivotal in
securing its narrow passage”).
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But look behind the curtain—nothing has changed since 1970. During
President Bush’s years in office, health insurance premiums have grown by
almost 80%, while the income of the average American family has grown by
only 19%.39 Each year the number of Americans who drop insurance
coverage increases40 despite the availability of low-premium, highdeductible catastrophic insurance plans. So far there is no evidence that the
consumer-driven approach is working; nor is there any evidence that
privatization of the Medicare program through Medicare Advantage and
private fee-for-service plans has impacted costs. One reason is that
Republicans are spending a lot of Medicare money to make private health
insurance available to beneficiaries, and care through private Medicare
plans is not available for 95% of traditional fee-for-service costs, like it was
in the 1980s. Instead, private insurance plans for Medicare beneficiaries
now cost between 112% and 119%, on average, of what traditional
Medicare costs per beneficiary.41
This year the Democrats are back in control of both Houses of
Congress, but Republicans have a veto-sustaining margin in the Senate and,
therefore, stymie Democratic health policy leaders. In the 2008 primary
campaign for President, most Republicans are supporting the ideology of
the MMA, advocating a greater use of tax-deductible insurance for
individual plan premiums and a national insurance market without national
rules for insurance companies, and backing employers out of the individual
employee health insurance coverage decision. This position is a contrast to
that of the Democratic candidates who put priority on achieving universal
coverage. Most Democrats also support efforts to contain costs through the
financing and reimbursement system and greater emphasis on quality,
value, and comparative effectiveness of technology.
The partisan divide continues in part because many American doctors
and all private insurance plans (except HMOs like Kaiser Permanente) like
the “business as usual” approach inherent in Republican notions of medical
markets.
Republicans do support efforts to achieve greater price
transparency, utilization of health information technology and electronic
39. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND SPENDING
2 (Sept. 2007), available at http://kff.org/insurance/upload/7692.pdf (last visited Jan. 2,
2008) (“Between 2002 and 2007, the cumulative growth in health insurance premiums was
78%, compared with cumulative inflation of 17% and cumulative wage growth of 19%.”).
40. See generally John Holahan & Allison Cook, Changes in Economic Conditions and
Health Insurance Coverage, 2000-2004, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W5-498 (discussing
the growing number of uninsured adults and the factors that may contribute to this trend).
41. See Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Patricia
Neuman, Vice President, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Director, Medicare Policy
Project).
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medical records, direct-to-consumer marketing of drugs and medical
devices, and any effort to end “socialized medicine as we’ve known it,”
including any requirements that employers provide or pay for health
insurance for employees.42
What does the future hold? By January of 2009, the United States will
probably have a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress.
(Although, this likely outcome would have more to do with the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars and Republican congressional ethics than with the health
policy debate.) Health policies will continue to focus on state and local
government efforts to improve cost containment, universal coverage, and
quality. While many of these efforts, unlike the current debates in
Washington, are fairly bipartisan, they will have limited success for two
reasons. First, meaningful universal coverage cannot be provided without
either new taxes or large amounts of federal dollars, and new taxes are not
a possibility. While federal contributions to state programs are increasing,
federal legislators are also attaching more directives to this spending, thus
diminishing the creativity of state coverage efforts. Second, value-based
cost containment strategies depend on the cooperation of medical
professionals. There are well-known parts of the country where localized
strategies will work when financially rewarded, but many more parts of the
country where these strategies either will not work or are substantially less
likely to work. If federal policy had a way to increase both financial rewards
for improved performance and financial risk for low performers, a different
outcome could be reached.
Furthermore, the election of a new president will play a role at the
national level, as a new president has a great deal of leverage in his/her
first years in office. Senator Clinton knows better than most that how that
power is used will determine the course of the Presidency. Of both parties’
candidates, she knows health policy the best, has the most experience, and
has the least to learn. Whoever is elected will likely take the advice she is
currently giving: to focus, first, on enhancing value through financing
changes in public programs like Medicare and Medicaid; second, to use
private health plans where they can produce a better result and pay them for
performance, just as most policymakers suggest we should be paying
providers for performance; third, to launch an investment strategy to
produce health information (and expand the technology to make it available

42. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND
MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA (Aug. 26, 2004), available at www.gop.com/media/2004
platform.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
A
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to all in a timely manner); and, finally, to reduce costs by reducing
unnecessary care.43
I remain an optimist about the future of healthcare in this country.
Presidential leadership in focusing the Medicare program on genuine
payment and delivery reform is very important, but it is not as important as
the health professional leadership that lies dormant in communities of
physicians and other professions across America. I have heard Walter
McClure, a well-respected health economist, say many times that American
medicine is remarkably inventive. When pointed in the right direction it will
steadily raise effectiveness and reduce cost, just as most other productive
industries do today.

43. For an explanation of Senator Clinton’s proposed health plan, see Hillary for
President, American Health Choices Plan, www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan (last
visited Jan. 16, 2008).

